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BARRIERS  TO  AMERICAN  AGRICULTURE  IN  WORLD  TRADE 
The  title chosen  could  suggest  that  American  agriculture has  a  vested  right  to 
flood  the  world  with its products  and  that it has  to  contend  with countries 
which take  a  mischievous  delight in erecting  "unfair trade  barriers". 
The  message  of  American  media  and  in many  speeches  made  by  US  leaders in the 
last  two  years  seems  to  be  that  these barriers  have  been deliberately set up 
by  the  Community  and  the  Community  alone.  I  am  therefore  very grateful to 
the  organizers  of this conference for  the  opportunity  they have  given me  to 
set  things  in a  fairer perspective. 
I  know  that  Chicago  is a  place where  issues  connected with trade are  taken 
seriously and  treated seriously.  This  means  having the  courage  to  face 
reality and  being  prepared  to  check  some  of  the political rhetoric  we  hear 
against  the facts. 
The  facts  I  want  to  put  to  you  today  should  help  to  show  what  is the  real 
shape-out  of  responsibility for current developments. 
There  are  three aspects: 
1.  The  absence  of specific barriers  to  United  State exports, 
2.  The  extent  to  which  American  policy is itself responsible  for the 
situation of farming  in the  United  States, 
3·  The  action taken by  the  Community  to settle its own  agricultural problems. - 2  -
1.  A first,  irrefutable point is that until 1981  American  exports  of 
agricultural products  were  expanding at a  spectacular tempo,  at a  rate well 
above  the  rate of the increase in 1'/"0rld  trade. 
The  increase  between 1973  and  1981  was  spectacular.  In  dollars,  the  increase  was 
from  $19  600 million to  $48  000 million.  The  surplus  earned  on  the  US 
agricultural  trade  balance  soared  from  $7  500 million in 1973  to  $22  700 
million in 1981.  But  this success  brought  with it, as successes often do,  a 
new  headache,  because  as  the years  passed,  the  United  States became  more  and 
more  dependent  on world markets  trends  which  are  notoriously 
unpredictable.  This  became  all  too  clear in 1982,  and  the  problem persists 
this year. 
The  Community,  too,  has  become  more  dependent  on  export markets:  in the last 
20  years it has  modernized  agricultural structures and  achieved  very 
substantial productivity gains.  Its production has  increased at an average 
rate  of  2.5%  annually over this  per~od.  With  high  consumption  Levels  and  no 
more  population  growth  the  Community  has  reached  and  passed  the  self-sufficiency 
threshold  for  many  products.  Later  I  will  tell  you  how  we  have  decided  to  cope 
with  the  new  situation. 
However,  the  expansion of the  Community's  agricultural production and  exports 
Graph  I  has  not  meant  lower imports.  In fact,  the  Community's  deficit on 
Global  agr.  $  agricultural trade is still a  matter of great concern.  It was  20  600 
trade  ba-
Lance  million in 1981,  down  from  $34 100 million in 1979. ~ilateral 
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The  reason for this is that the general arrangements for imports  into the 
Community  are,  whatever may  be  thought  on this side  of  the  Atlantic,  among  the 
most  liberal in the  western world:  the  Community  takes  one  quarter of world 
imports  of agricultural products,  and  this makes  it the  largest importer of 
such products in the  world. 
In 1982,  only  15%  of the  Community's  agricultural imports  from  industrialized 
countries  were  subject  to  the  variable levies system,  so  sharply criticized by 
the  US  administration for more  than  20 years.  As  for the  other 85%,  more 
than  50%  of imports  from  industrialized countries  came  in over  zero  duties. 
This  accounts  for  the  very sharp increase  in imports  of products  for animal 
feed  from  the  United  States and  a  steady deterioration in the  deficit  ;n 
agricultural trade with  the  United  States,  which  rose  from  $3  600 million, 
that  is  2  900  million  ECU  in 1973  to  $7  400 million,  that is 6  600 million  ECU 
in 1981. 
I  cannot  deny  that  this trend is causing us  concern.  Voluntary  restraint 
agreements  have  been  concluded  with  the  countries  supplying manioc.  The 
Levies  on  imports  of bran have  been  increased.  A solution must  be  found,  in 
cooperation with  the  United States,  for corn gluten feed. 
Whatever  the  conventional  wisdom  dispensed  by  the  media  on  this side of the 
Atlantic  may  say,  I  am  quite  sure  that  competition from  the  Community  is not 
the  reason rrhy  US  agricultural exports  declined  in 1982. - 4 -
A closer examination  shows  that in respect  of many  agricultural products  the 
Community  does  not  compete  with  the  United  States  on world  markets at all. 
In fact,  it is a  net  importer of products  which  the  United  States is finding 
it hard  to  dispose of abroad. 
example, 
For~he Community,  which grows  practically no  soya  of its own,  is your best 
customer for this product.  Our  imports  of beans  and  cake  rose  from 
2.8 million tonnes  in 1966  to  12.8 million  tonnes  in 1981. 
The  fall in soya market  prices  and  the  export difficulties in 1982  have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  Community,  which  has  made  no  changes  in its import 
arrangements. 
This  is also  true for corn gluten feed,  which is produced  in negligible 
quantities in Europe  and  almost  all of  the  US  production of which is sold  in 
the  Community •.  From  a  few  thousand  tonnes  in 197  ,  US  exports  had  swollen to 
almost  3  million  tonnes  by  1982. 
The  Community  also  grows  less  corn  than it needs  and  imports nearly  9  million 
tonnes,  almost all  from  the  United  States. 
We  are  net  importers  of  citrus  fruit  and  of  a  Large  number  of  fruits  and 
vegetables,  cotton,  and  other  products. - 5  -
In this connection,  the  criticism of  the  Community's  preferential agreements 
with Mediterranean countries is both unjustified,  since  the  United  States 
retains its overall share  in the  Community  market  for  the  relevant products, 
and  undiscerning,  because of the political importance  of these  agreements  for 
the  western world. 
If we  examine  things in depth  we  find  that  the  areas  of friction  on  world 
markets  are much  smaller than  some  critics are apt  to  suggest.  Really,  they 
concern only  the  wheat  and  flour markets,  and  chicken.  And,  of course,  the 
problems  must  be  seen in their proper perspective.  vli th  regard  to wheat  and 
flour,  it is true  that  the  Community  exported  14 million  tonnes  of  these 
products  in 1982,  14%  of  the  world  market,  but  I  •vould  remind  you  that  this 
proportion  had  already  been  achieved  by  the  Community  thirteen years  ago 
(1969-70),  a  year in which  the  United  States  had  only  33%  of the  world market, 
Table III  whilst its share  today is much  nearer  50%. 
Table  IV 
With  regard  to  poultrymeat,  the  key  development  is  the  rapid  emergence  of a 
newcomer,  Brazil,  which in less  than  six years,  from  1975  to  1981,  boosted its 
share of  the  w·orld  market  from  negligible  quanti ties to  20%,  encroaching  on 
the  exports  of  both the  United  States  and  the  Community. 
There  is nothing  here  to  explain the  aggressiveness  of the  United  States in 
its attitude to  the  Community's  export  refund  arrangements.  This is an 
attitude we  find  surprising,  since it seems  to  be  a  criticism of export 
subsidies  as  authorized  by  the  Code  on  Subsidies  and  Countervailing Measures 
adopted  following  the  Tokyo  Round.  But  you  know  that  the  Community  has - 6  -
never  refused  to  comply  with  the  procedures  and  decisions  adopted  under 
the  Code  to  ensure  respect  for  relevant  GATT  rules. 
I  do  not  say  this  because,  on  the  question  of  flour,  the  GATT  panel  set  up  on 
the  initiative of  the  United  States  did  not  come  to the  conclusion  that  the 
Community  had  taken  more  than  an  equitable  share  of  an  expanding  world  market. 
No,  the  United  States attitude surprises  me  because  I  get  the  impression  that 
our  critics do  tend  to  see  only the mote  in  the  eye  of  their  neighbour. 
After all, all  exporting  countries  pay  export  or  production  subsidies  of  one 
kind  or  another,  and  American  exporters  have  certainly no  grounds  for  complaint 
on  this point. 
I  shall  not  dwell  on  the  ways  international  trade  can  be  distorted  by  blended 
credits,  the  PL  480,  drawback,  and  so  on.  Let  me  simply  say  that  the  United 
States'  sale  to  Egypt  of  1  million  tonnes  of  flour,  or  about  a  fifth  of  the 
world  market,  at  a  price  Z 20  to  30  below  normal  prices,  is definitely from  the 
Community  point  of  view  an  infringement  of  GATT,  and  that  we  disagree  with  the 
view  that  temporary,  trade-distorting measures  such  as  the  wheat  flour  transactic 
can  be  justified on  the  ground  that  "when  all  the  world  is  mad,  'tis folly 
to  be  sane".  What  is  quite  certain  is that  this  US  action  can  in  no  way 
find  its justification in  the  findings  of  the  panel  on  EEC  flour  exports. 
Furthermore  the  net  result  of  the  US-Egypt  deal  is  simply 7
2. 
to  depress  flour  prices  on  the  world  market.  Indeed  it even  depresses  wheat 
prices,  since  the  sales  price of  the  flour  is  in  fact  lower  than  the  cost  of 
the  raw  materials  involved  in  its production. 
There  is  a  saying  to  the  effect  that  people  who  live  in glass  houses 
should  not  throw  stones.  One  does,  indeed,  sometimes  wonder  whether  the  __ 
United  States  market  offers  that  freedom  from  barriers  to  trade  which  the 
United  States authorities are  so  anxious  to  see  achieved  on  the  world  market. 
I  must  say,  I  doubt  it.  The  facilities available  to  the  American  authorities 
through  the  waiver  empower  the  President  to institute for  major  products, 
as  sokn  as  the  need  is felt,  import  quotas,  additional  charges,  domestic 
price  compliance  rules -all measures  which  are  just as  formidable  as  any 
of  the  machinery  the  Community  uses  to ensure  Community  preference. 
Secondly,  I  should  like  to  put  it to  you  that  the  problems  American,_ 
farmers  have  to  content  with  are  largely due  to  Americanpolicy  itself. 
I  can  understand  that  for  reasons  of  internal  politics it is  convenient  tc 
put  it about  that  competitors'  export  subsidies  are  the  reason  for  the 
deterioration  in  the  situation of  farming  in  the  United  States.  But  the 
facts  do  not  support  this.  Many  developments  have  helpedto  widen  the  gap 
between  supply  and  demand  for  agricultural  products  and  thus  aggravate 
the  recession. 
Some  are  inherent  in  the  development  of  American  agriculture  itself; 
others  are  more  economic  and  political. - 8  -
Those  inherent in American agricultural policy include  the  increase,  during 
the  seveties,  of the  total cultivated area in the  United States by  60 million 
acres  and  of the productivity of farming  by more  than 10%. 
The  United  States was  already self-sufficient in 1970,  and  could  therefore 
dispose  of the  increase in production  only  by  winning  new  export markets. 
A more  serious matter is that  American  farmers  went  on intensifying production 
capacity at a  time  when,  in the  second  half of  the  seventies,  economic 
conditions  were  deteriorating. 
A policy of  easy credit proved  a  sharp  spur to  investment.  Farmers' 
borrowings  tripled in the seventies,  to  reach  a  figure  of $150  000 million. 
This  is not  denied  by  Mr  Block,  who  recently observed:  '~ith plentiful and 
easy credit and  rising land  values  during  the  seventies,  farmers  found  it 
advantageous  to escalate borrowing and  make  heavy capital investments. 
Results  were  dramatic  indeed.  Between  1971  and  1982,  farmers  increased  the 
area planted  to principal crops". 
What  was  bound  to  happen happened  qu~te soon.  There  have  been  record  crops 
in  recent years.  Between 1975  and  1981,  United  States production  rose - 9  -
from  57-9  million  tonnes  to  76.2 million tonnes  for 1vheat 
from  41.4 million tonnes  to  56.5 million tonnes  for  soya 
from  146.5 million tonnes  to  208.3 million  tonnes  for corn 
from  52-3 million tonnes  to  59-0 million tonnes  for milk  (1980) 
or from  115  400  million pounds  to  128  400  million pounds. 
The  equilibrium of world  markets is always  rather unstable,  and  production 
growth  on  this scale was  bound  to  give it a  severe  jolt. 
The  sharp increase in supply,  not  offset  by  demand,  now  quite weak,  has  led 
Mr  Block  to  admit  that  the  resulting decline in prices of agricultural 
products  has  been  reducing  the  incomes  of  US  farmers  to  the  lo1vest  point  since 
the  depression in the  thirties at  the  very  time  1vhen  their interest payments 
are  increasing. 
What  American  farmers  need  right  now  is the  ~arket  stabilizing  machinery  which 
the  US  authorities  have  always  criticized  in the  Community. 
'""" 
With  regard  to  the  more  economic  and  political factors,  it is clear that 
American  farming  has,  like agriculture  elsewhere,  been  caught  by  the 
disruption of economic  equilibria resulting  from  the persistence of  the  1973 
crisis. 
It  is  true that  US  monetary  policy  has  not  been  very  helpful. ~-~----~----------------
- 10  -
In the  last  two  years,  with production steadily groiving  as  rationalization and 
modernization has  progressed,  interest rates have  risen and  the dollar has 
made  gains against  the  other currencies  thus  helping  to  force  up  the sales 
prices of  American products in foreign countries and  depress us  f arrn  gate 
prices. 
But  monetary policy is not  the  only culprit.  The  decline  in value  of  US 
agricultural exports  from  $43  800 million in 1981  to  $39  100 million in 1982 
and  the  further reduction of $2  000 million expected  for 1983,  at a  time  when 
the  volume  of  American  exports  declined  by  only  2%  between  1981  and  1982 is 
only a  symptom  of  the crisis.  The  recession,  which  has  taken its toll nearly 
everywhere  in the  world,  is cutting deeply  into effective demand  for 
agricultural products  in the  industrialized countries and  in the  developing 
countries. 
In many  Latin American  and  eastern  European countries,  the  United States,  like 
the  Community,  is suffering heavy  losses  of exports,  because  of  the  payments 
difficulties these  countries  have  run into,  engendered  by  their mounting  debts. 
This  is why  the  United  States exported  only  2  million tonnes  of cereals  to 
:!~Texico  in 1982,  down  from  6  million tonnes  in 1981. 
European  countries also dropped  by  50%. 
Exports  to  the eastern 
Everybody  concedes  that the  former  administrations  embargo  policy cut  back 
the U··dted  StatP~
1  share  i11  Soviet  i:in::>6rts  of  cereals ·from  7J 
0
~  in 1977  to 
30  % in 1982. - 11-
This  is a  barrier to  American  exports 1..rhich  we  really did  not  put  up.  Nor 
are  we  responsible  for  increasing  exports  of  Brazilian  soya_  which  were  helpe~ 
by  the  temporary  embargo  on  exports  of  this  produ~t put  up  by  the  lJnited  States 
in  1973.  This  does  not  mean  that  I  deny  that  the  Community  does  competeJ  within 
the  Limits  I  have  suggestedr  on  world  markets,  but  I  do  feel  that  responsibilities 
must  be  properly  assigned. 
3·  The  last point  I  want  to make  is that  although  the  Community  does  not 
accept  responsibility for the  American difficulties, it is making  efforts to 
solve its own  problems.  But  it must  be  made  clear that  the  Community's 
agricultural policy can  be  adapted  only in terms  of  Community  priorities,  just 
as  the  agricultural policies of other countries  are  adjusted  on  the  basis of 
the  priorities set by  these  countries.  This  is only  reasonable. 
The  common  agricultural policy is more  than  20  years  old.  Over  the  years,  it 
has  changed  and  developed.  There  could  be  no  greater mistake  than  to  imagine 
that it is static or monolithic. 
The  Community  has  decided  to adapt  to what  is a  completely new  situation,  that 
of its being a  permanent  exporter of agricultural products.  It has  learned 
the  lessons  of its greater dependence  on  the  world  market,  which is expensive, 
for  the  difference  between  the  rather  stable  COmiilUni ty  price  and  the  fluctuating 
price  obtained  on  the  world  m~rket  is  paid  to  the  exporter  in  the  form  of 
"reftmds"- and  this  money  comes  from  Community  funds. ------------------
- 12  -
As  the  Community  budgetis  not  inexhaustible,  it has  been agreed  that it is 
neither feasible in financial  terms  nor sound in economic  terms  to maintain 
' 
guaranteed  prices for  unli~ed quantities,  regardless  of market  needs. 
Hence,  in the  "Guidelines  for  European  Agriculture",  adopted  in 1981  as  a  sort 
of  "Charter of Agriculture"  for future years,  it was  proposed  that  our exports 
could  be  increased  only: 
if we  reduce  the  cost  of our exports  by  narrowing  the  gap  between our 
prices and  world  prices, 
if we  ask  our  farmers  to  pay  some  or all of  the  cost  of  disnosing  of 
p~oduction beyond  certain thresholds. 
Since  then,  a  cautious policy on prices has  been pursued,  taking  account  both 
of the  situation on  the  markets  and  the  situation as  regards  farmers' 
incomes.  The  increase  p~oposed for  the 1983/84 marketing year,  which  1-ras  to 
have  begun  on 1  April,  is 5.5%. 
In the cereals  sector,  we  have  already applied  this policy when  the guarantee 
prices  were  fixed  last year,  by  increasing cereals  prices less  than  the  others. 
This  year,  we  will continue  to  reduce  by  1.5%  the  gap  between our prices  and 
those  obtained  by  farmers in the  main  competing countries.  This is something 
we  can do  1vi thout  causing  undue  hardship,  as  the  productivity of our farmers 
leaves  room  for this saving.  'vle  must  do  it in order to  cut  the cost of 
cattle feed  and  make  imports  of grain substitutes less attractive. - 13  -
We  have  also  extended  the  use  of the  "guarantee  thresholds" 
The  principle  of guarantee  thresholds  was  built into  the machinery  of our farm 
policy  some  time  ago. 
The  products  concerned  were: 
sugar,  which,  since  1968 has  been subject  to  a  co-responsibility scheme 
involving producers  in the  cost  of exports.  Since  1  July 1981,  producers 
have  been covering  the  cost  of  their exports  in its entirety 
milk,  for which  a  co-responsibility levY  has  been charged  since  1977• 
It is now  2%  of  the  target price for milk. 
We  have  now  refined  the  concept  and  extended it to  other products. 
It is applicable at the  present  time  to  five  main policy sectors  - cereals, 
milk,  colza,  processed  tomatoes  and  sugar.  The  five  sectors  represent: 
65%  of  the  gross  expenditure  of  the  EAGGF  Guarantee  Section, 
35%  of  the  value  of  Community  agricultural production. 
To  illustrate this,  let me  tell you  that  our  Council  of Ministers  had  decided 
that if production of cereals  and  colza  exceeds  fixed  thresholds,  the 
intervention price for  the  following marketing year will be  cut.  Since  the 
thresholds  for 1982  were  exceeded,  we  automatically drew  the  conclusions  which 
were  necessary in our price proposals  for 1983. - 14  -
for cereals,  a  1%  reduction is therefore  to  be  added  to  the  1.5%  reduction 
already proposed  for price  alignment  purposes.  The  increase in prices  in 
1983 will therefore  be  only  3%  instead of 5-5%-
With  regard  to  colza,  the  increase  of  5.5%  is  reduced  to  4.5%;  this also 
represents  a  reduction  of 1%. 
With  regard  to milk,  the  Council  decided  that measures  should  be  taken if 
the  increase in deliveries  compared  to  Last  year  exceeded  0.5  %~  which 
corresponds  to  the  average  annual  increase  in  Community  consumption.  Since 
the  increase  in  deliveries  for  1982  has  reached  3.5%,  the  Commission  proposed 
for  1983  that  intervention prices  for  milk  should  be  increased  by  only  2.3%, 
a  good  3%  below  the  5.5%  norm. 
On  another point,  there  has  been  American  criticism of production or 
processing aids  granted  by  the  Community  in the  firm  of deficiency payments  to 
Mediterranean farmers,  but  I  would  like  to  point out  that  the  sole object of 
these  schemes  has  been to maintain and  where  possible  step up  production 
located in what  we  call  "less-favoured" areas. 
These  aids are  strictly limited  and  supervised,  and  the  scheme  cannot  possibly 
constitute  a  threat  to  American  farmers. 
These  are,  then,  the  measures  adopted  by  the  Community  to  restore  sound 
operation on its  agricultural  markets. 
As  you  can see,  we  are  definitely  not~abandoning the  common  agricultural 
policy,  for it has  a  social function which is of overwhelming  importance,  but 
we  are  adapting it in ways  which  will enable  us  to  preserve what  matters 
most  -price stability and  reliable supplies. ----------------- -------- --- -----------------------------
- 15  -
The  Community  is not  responsible  for  the  barriers  to  world  trade about  which 
US  exporters  feeel  so  resentful.  I  hope  I  have  brought  this message  home  to 
you.  The  Community  is not  interested in,  and  does  not  want,  a  confrontation 
with  the  United  States.  It has  shown  that it is prepared  to  talk.  It is 
still prepared  to  talk,  but  each party must  be  aware  of what  it  stands to 
lose,  and  you  know  that  we  are your best  customers. 
There  is no  doubt  that  a  subsidy war would  cost  a  fortune,  both in the 
Community  and  in the  United  States. 
I  feel  that  we  have  no  choice but  to  hammer  out  an  agreement.  Solutions  can 
be  found.  But  it  would  really be  a  very  great  mistake  to  corner  the  Community 
into  a  position  where  it  is  forced  to  take  protectionist measures. 16
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